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Abstract The present paper investigates cluster adjustment to changing economic
environments by focussing on the role and stability of institutional arrangements in
their local culture. It postulates two idealtypical local cultures where firms act in the
common (collective) or in their own interest (egoistic). By comparing adjustment per-
formance and stability for both types, the model finds that clusters in very volatile
environments are unlikely to exhibit collective local cultures as these are unstable
and provide only limited benefits for adjustment performance. Clusters facing more
stable environments are more likely to show collective local cultures as these increase
adjustment performance and are more stable against individual defection. Both fin-
dings suggest that collective local cultures in clusters can be relatively stable for limited
environment volatility.
Keywords Clusters · Adjustment · N/K model · Local culture
1 Introduction
Since the works of Brusco (1982), Krugman (1991) or Porter (1990), the phenomenon
of non-random spatial concentrations of firms in one or few related industries (often
referred to as clusters (Ellison and Glaeser 1997)) has become a prominent topic in
economic theory and policy. The existence and success of clusters is usually justified
by the benefits conveyed to co-located firms (as compared to isolated enterprises),
which encompass (Marshall 1920, pp. 280–284):
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1. Better control of employees, easier communication, and less waste of material due
to the (on average) smaller size of establishments.
2. Greater flexibility in product characteristics and output quantities through chan-
ging networks of suppliers and end-producers.
3. The emergence of external scale economies (agglomeration externalities) through
joint conduct of related activities. These agglomeration externalities include infor-
mation and knowledge spillovers through inter-firm observation and collaboration;
the emergence of pooled labour markets due to immigation and training activity of
local firms; as well as scale and specialisation benefits due to a division of labour
in production.
In order for agglomeration externalities to emerge, local firms have to overcome
a variety of dilemma. Those companies willing to invest in activities contributing to
agglomeration externalities are liable to exploitation from free-riders. “The mysteries
of the trade” will only be “as it were in the air” (Marshall 1920, p. 271) and thereby
contribute to greater creation and dissemination of knowledge in the cluster if there
is an understanding between firms as to what can be done with the knowledge gained
from others. Similarly, investment in worker training contributing to a pooled local
market for skilled employees is only a viable strategy, if firms can capitalise on this
investment; i.e. if the trained worker is not immediately hired away by a competitor.
Finally, a division of labour giving rise to specialised suppliers will only emerge if
suppliers can trust to sell their inputs at a fair price.1
To solve these dilemma situations, clusters develop a local culture that acts as a
form of governance between firms (Robertson and Langlois 1995). This local culture
comprises rules on acceptable business behaviour as well as a mechanism for their
enforcement. Usually, it is argued that the rules emerge as agents in the cluster learn
from experiences in exchange with others. Geographic proximity facilitates this pro-
cess, since actors in the same area already share a set of formal institutions such as
legislation as well as some general informal institutions like norms deriving from their
respective (national or regional) cultural background. As a result, they are more likely
to agree on judging specific forms of behaviour as desirable or undesirable (Louch
2000) and more specific local rules would evolve to provide incentives for desirable
activities.
To ensure the enforcement of the rules of the local culture, different mechanisms
exist: Punishment by more powerful parties in hierarchical clusters, use of formal insti-
tutions against defecting agents (Caeldries 1996), or informal collective enforcement.
The last mechansim argues that agents in the cluster observe each other’s activities2
and punish defectors by exclusion from all future exchanges (Holländer 1990; Kandel
and Lazear 1992; Varian 1990). As agents in the cluster usually interact in a variety
of networks (Cappellin 2003), defection in one then entails the risk of losing other
1
“The one who makes the heads of the pins must be certain of the co-operation of the one who makes the
points if he does not want to run the risk of producing pin heads in vain” (List 1909, Book II, Chap. XII,
p. 7).
2 This joint observation and punishment is assisted by geographic proximity: Agents can meet easily due
to neglible travel costs and often also interact outside the business sphere.
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valuable ties. This greatly increases the cost of defection, ensuring compliance with
the rules of the local culture.3
Locating in a cluster characterised by agglomeration externalities and a local culture
can enhance company performance as is evidenced by a variety of success stories
worldwide (see Porter (1990) or Saxenian (1994) among many others). At the same
time, the focus on successful clusters neglects that many of the old industrial areas of
today were successful clusters in the heyday of their industries. As the technological
and economic environment changed, these industrial structures proved unable to adapt
and were rendered obsolete (Braunerhjelm et al. 2000; Bresnahan et al. 2001; Grabher
1993; Massey and Meegan 1982). The critical aspect about adaptation in clusters is,
that the very drivers of cluster success can become liabilities in the face of change.
If agglomeration externalities and a local culture exist, firms are constrained in their
adjustment activity. Agglomeration externalities imply that the success of individual
activities depends on the actions adopted by others. Additionally, specific rules in the
cluster’s local culture could rule out necessary adjustment measures as unacceptable
business behaviour.
This role of local rules for the adaptability of firms and clusters is emphasised
in much of the empirical literature (e.g. Boschma and Lambooy 2002; Cainelli and
Zoboli 2004; Lombardi 2003; Saxenian 1994). Regarding insight into the optimum
type of local culture, the evidence is however mixed. Some contributions propose that
the key to success in clusters is a local culture fostering strong inter-firm competititon
(Porter 1990).4 This notion suggests that clusters with firms acting in their own best
interest tend to be particularly successful. Other contributions (Maillat 1998; Pyke et al.
1990) have argued that the blending of social and business ties in clusters or particular
attitudes of individuals (Saxenian 1994) could give rise to local cultures prescribing
more collective firm behaviour than the standard economic rationale would predict. In
this notion, it is argued that clusters with firms selecting strategies to benefit the cluster
as a whole perform very well. This type of attitude would ensure that “the industry
as a whole progresses regardless of the fate of any individual firm” (Saxenian 1994,
p. 45).
The notion of collective firm behaviour is a very controversial aspect in the cluster
concept, especially when stability and adjustability are concerned. Regarding stability,
the question is whether the often informal mechanisms described in the literature
(collective observation and punishment) are sufficient to enforce collective behaviour,
especially when considering that acting in the interest of the cluster is unlikely to
always benefit the firm itself (at least not in the short run). It would take a very accurate
3 Such a credible threat of punishment can already be sufficient to enforce co-operation (Fehr and Schmidt
1999).
4 In this framework, instances of collaboration are also possible. The resulting co-opetition can be structured
according to the stage of the value chain as developed by Maskell (2001), where firms offering complemen-
tary activities collaborate while those involved in the same value chain stage compete. Co-opetition can also
be conditional on time, i.e. firms can collaborate for a while (e.g. during projects) to return to competition
afterwards (Grabher 2002; Maskell and Lorenzen 2004). Finally, co-opetition might depend on the type of
activity performed. For instance, competing firms can collaborate in order to generate collective resources
such as infrastructure or organise political influence (Porter 1990).
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detection of defective activity as well as immediate and consequent punishment by all
cluster agents in order to enforce this kind of activity.
In changing environments, stability may become an issue as change may affect the
detectability of misbehaviour and thereby reduce the enforcability of a collective local
culture. Detection may be reduced since clusters do not readily allow for a mapping of
the effect of agent activities on her intentions, especially after environmental change.
This is due to two aspects. First, cluster activities are conducted by independent agents
which share agglomeration externalities between them. As a result, agent activities—
even when directed at the benefit of the cluster—do not have to lead to collectively
optimal results and adverse effects of agent strategies may be caused by defective
behaviour as well as by conflicts between individual actions. Second, environmental
change implies that adverse effects can also be due to a mismatch between old strategies
and new circumstances. Agents in a cluster facing changing conditions could therefore
be tempted to use these detection problems in order to defect from the prescribed
collective behaviour and act in their own best interest instead. Any negative effects
conveyed by their egoistic activities on other agents might then be blamed on the new
environmental conditions.
For agents in the cluster to use this opportunity, defection has to pay, i.e. the payoff
associated with egoistic behaviour has to be higher than that of the prescribed collective
attitude. Due to agglomeration externalities between agents, this is not necessarily the
case. If an agent selects activities that benefit herself at the expense of others in the
cluster (e.g. a supplier cutting costs by using cheaper material), this may harm other
firms that this very agent depends on (e.g. the corresponding end-producer). As a
result, defection could also harm the defector. If it however pays to defect, the next
issue is the stability of the overall local culture, i.e. whether a defecting agent can
‘invade’ a population of collectively oriented agents and destabilise a collective local
culture. If this is not the case, defection would be sustainable and the local culture
would remain stable.
In addition to stability, one has to investigate the role of a local culture for cluster
adjustability. In the existing literature, it is sometimes argued that clusters with collec-
tive local cultures might be too slow in adjusting to changing economic environments
(Brusco 1986; Brusco and Righi 1989; Cainelli and Zoboli 2004; Capecchi 1990; Pyke
et al. 1990). This is due to the fact that it takes longer to discover strategies that benefit
the entire cluster rather than an individual firm. As a result, the presence of agents
acting in their own interest could increase cluster adjustability, i.e. defection might be
beneficial for clusters facing changing environments.
The present paper investigates both aspects, thereby shedding light on the stability
of collective local cultures and their role in cluster adjustment. It takes two benchmark
cases of clusters with collective and egoistic local cultures, i.e. situations where all
firms act in the interest of the cluster or in their own interest. Beyond these two cases,
the model introduces mixed clusters where some agents act in accordance with the
rules prescribing collective behaviour while different and given numbers of agents
defect from this consensus. These different cluster types are then exposed to environ-
ments with different degrees of volatility. By comparing adjustment performance at
the cluster and producer group level, the model provides some insight (at the aggre-
gate level), regarding whether and when defection from a collective local culture pays
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for agents and their groups, whether this defection destabilises the local culture and
whether the presence of defecting agents can help the cluster adjust to environmental
changes.
Finding conditions under which defection pays and destabilises an established col-
lective local culture could then assist in explaining a move towards more hierarchical
enforcement mechanisms (as has been observed in many Italian districts by Boschma
and Lambooy 2002; Cainelli and Zoboli 2004; Lombardi 2003) or highlight the type
of environment in which one is particularly likely to find clusters with collective or
egoistic local cultures. In order to do so, the paper develops a simulation model based
on the N/K method developed by Kauffman (1993). The model includes firms that
act in compliance with an established collective local culture as well as those compa-
nies that defect from these rules by acting egoistically. It finds that in environments
where change is significant, collective local cultures provide only limited benefits to
cluster performance. Moreover, when defection pays, it is rarely sustainable and does
not help cluster adjustment. In environments where change is smaller yet frequent,
collective local cultures increase cluster performance. Individual defection may pay
but is usually sustainable and beneficial to cluster adjustment. Both findings suggest
that in specific situations, collective behaviour in clusters may well be more stable
than is usually acknowledged.
2 The model
The present model integrates a smallest common denominator about the nature of
clusters in the existing literature with the aspects of cooperation and defection within
a collective local culture.5 In doing so, it investigates whether defection is possible and
to what extent it may even be beneficial for the adjustment performance of the cluster
as a whole. This aim is achieved by taking a cluster with a collective local culture
and introducing varying numbers of defecting agents. As will be shown in more detail
later, agent strategies adhering to and defecting from the local culture have distinct
advantages and downsides in adaptation, which will map out differently depending on
the setup of the cluster and the volatility of its environment.
2.1 Cluster setup
As was highlighted in the introductory section, clusters are composed of a variety of
firms specialising in different stages of the same production process. Due to agglo-
meration externalities, the activities of a firm can have a positive or negative effect
on the outcome of activities conducted by another (e.g. supplier quality impacting on
the quality of end-producers). The existence of a collective local culture implies that
5 While similar to previous studies of organisational adjustment using the same methodology (Dosi et al.
2003; Marengo et al. 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003; Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003; Siggelkow and
Rivkin 2005), the present model’s unit of analysis (organisations in a cluster) implies that a number of
aspects about agent dynamics differ. This involves the fact that the activities relevant to the cluster are
controlled by several, independent agents rather than one firm. Moreover, the lack of central authority in a
cluster means that agents do not necessarily arrive at collectively optimal results.
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Fig. 1 Intra- (x1, x2/x5, x6) and inter-agent (x1, x4/x5, x8) externalities in a cluster with N = 9 value
chain activities split into three substrings with n = 3
co-operating firms (altruists) will favour activities that benefit the cluster as a whole
whereas defecting ones (egoists) act in their own best interest. The success of any clus-
ter then depends on agent activities, their interplay due to agglomeration externalities
as well as the fit of agent and cluster dynamics with the greater economic environment.
Changes in this environment therefore also impact on the success of the cluster itself.
In order to account for these aspects, the model uses the N/K methodology develo-
ped by Kauffman (1993). The cluster is represented by a local value chain composed
of N elements (activities). Each element can take on two states [0; 1], which represent
different strategy choices for an activity. The success of these choices is then reflected
in the fitness contribution of the activity, which is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 1. All fitness contributions depend on the state of their
activity, environmental conditions as well as any positive or negative influences of
interdependent activities.
Fig. 2 Model setup: Three agents form one group conducting the activities belonging to one substring (e.g.
x1-x3)
When modelling clusters as N/K systems, one has to take into account that the
different activities in the cluster’s value chain are controlled by several independent
organisations (also: actors, agents). This gives rise to two different types of interde-
pendencies (see also Fig. 1): Intra-agent externalities affect activities controlled by
one agent and reflect that certain strategy choices (e.g. research and production) need
to be aligned to produce good results. In clusters, moreover, interdependencies can
exist between activities controlled by different agents (inter-agent externalities).6 This
mirrors the effects of agglomeration externalities. Due to inter-agent externalities, stra-
tegy choices by one agent may feed back onto the success (=fitness) of others. With
the existence of these externalities, individual activities may thus create unexpected
or unintended collective results (Axelrod and Cohen 1999).
6 In the N/K model, intra-agent externalities are usually denoted by the parameter K and inter-agent ones
by C . Both measure the average number of interdependent elements.
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In addition, clusters usually host several firms producing a certain sub-product. The
model includes this fact by having different groups of agents representing one stage in
the value chain (see also Fig. 2). Each of these groups contains several agents (three
in Fig. 2), that all conduct the activities (e.g. x1-x3) in the respective substring.7
2.2 Environment
In the N/K framework, each of the 2N configurations of value chain activities has
a different fitness value (equaling the mean value of the fitness contributions of all
activity states). Taken together, they form the fitness landscape of the cluster. As the
fitness values of elements are determined by environmental conditions, any change in
the cluster’s environment will be represented as an alteration of the fitness landscape.
Depending on how agent behaviour and cluster structure work together, the cluster
can fare better or worse in adjusting to these changes, i.e. it can discover fitter or worse
new configurations after the change in the landscape occurred.
The environment’s volatility is distinguished according to the extent of external
perturbations and their frequency. There are shock environments in which the entire
fitness landscape changes after a certain time as well as disturbance environments,
where only part of the landscape is altered (for detail, see Sect. 3). In addition,
the time allowed for cluster adjustment differs. In fast environments, it equals 300
simulation steps and in slow environments, 600 steps precede any change event. Four
environmental constellations are therefore investigated: Volatile environments encom-
pass slow and fast shocks while more stable environments are characterised by slow
and fast disturbances.
2.3 Dynamics
The model’s dynamics map out as follows. In each simulation step, all cluster agents
seek better configurations by altering the states of the elements they control (search).
Agents then test if the new configuration is better than the previous one according to
different criteria that will represent the local culture in the cluster. If the new confi-
guration constitutes an improvement in expected fitness, it is selected. This test and
selection is done assuming that other agents in the cluster do not change their activi-
ties: Due to uncertainties about other’s future activities and the exact interdependence
with them, actors are better off selecting strategies that would work well in the current
context. This means that depending on the actions undertaken by others, individual
activities may miss their goals or lead to unanticipated aggregate effects.
After selecting a configuration, agents engage in a bidding process to be chosen
to represent their producer group. This mirrors the learning from observation at the
horizontal level of the cluster as emphasised by Maskell (2001); Porter (1990) among
others: Competing firms facing the same locational conditions can easily observe,
whether a competitor has found a good strategy and then imitate it. As a result, best
7 This implementation ascertains that all agents in one stage of the value chain (e.g. all end producers)
control the same range of activities. Moreover, there is no overlap in activities between value chain stages.
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practice will quickly diffuse in groups of competing cluster firms. Since agent activities
are interdependent, best practice corresponds to strategies that work well within the
context of other cluster agent activities. As a result, the agent with the best configuration
regarding expected fitness of the entire cluster is chosen to represent her group. In the
final stage of each simulation step, all chosen agent configurations are taken together,
determining the actual fitness of the cluster (the value chain) and its agent groups.
The cluster’s local culture impacts on agent strategy selection by determining to
what extent agents take the effect of their actions on others into account when testing
a new configuration. The two types of agents investigated here are altruists (agents
adhering to a collective local culture by acting the interest of the cluster) and egoists
(agents defecting from the local culture by acting only in their own best interest). To
single out the influence of both agent types on the performance of clusters and their
constituent agent groups, the simulation model accounts for seven different cluster
types. It uses the benchmark cases of clusters composed of only altruistic agents (Coll)
and only defecting (Ego) agents. In between both cases, different numbers of egoistic
agents are introduced into the first group of producers. As a result, the setups of Ego1
to Ego5 describe settings where there are 1-5 egoistic (defecting) agents located in the
first group.
The difference between the two agent types is that altruists select new configura-
tions only if they improve the expected average fitness of the entire cluster whereas
egoists select any configuration that provides a higher expected fitness for the subset
of activities that they control. This difference in agent behaviour will matter for the
dynamics of clusters when understood as N/K systems.8 Altruists trying to improve
the fitness of all N elements are less likely to find improvements in their configura-
tion than egoists aiming to increase the fitness of their n elements (Press 2006). The
modifications found by altruistic agents will however tend to be better for the cluster:
As altruists do not ignore externalities of their activities on other agents, they tend to
propose better configurations for the cluster as a whole. The opposite hols for egoists
implying that there is a tradeoff in speed and efficiency between both agent types.
These aspects lead to the following propositions about the advantages and down-
sides of altruists and egoists. Altruists will be slower in encountering superior confi-
gurations, i.e. they generate fewer changes in their substring. The configurations that
are selected will however be better for the cluster as a whole. Egoists in turn are faster
in encountering superior configurations, i.e. they generate more changes in their sub-
string. The configurations proposed may however be worse for the cluster as a whole.
Having defection in the cluster will therefore increase the speed of adjustment to any
change in the fitness landscape, while adversely influencing the results and stability
of adjustment processes. Both aspects will materialise to differing extent depending
on the cluster’s structure and environmental conditions.
8 As was found by previous work (Frenken 2006; Kauffman 1993; Marengo et al. 2000), the dynamics of
any N/K system depend on three aspects. The structure of the system (size and interdependence), agent
search, and agent selection mechanisms. By keeping structure and search identical, the model can investigate
the effect of selection (differing according to agent adherence to or defection from the local culture) on the
performance of the cluster and its groups.
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Table 1 Intra- (x) and inter-agent (x) externalities a cluster with N = 9 value chain activities split into
three substrings with n = 3 and a block distribution of interdependencies of length l = 2 and l = 4
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
x1 - x
x2 x -
x3 - x
x4 x -
x5 - x
x6 x -
x7 - x
x8 x -
x9 x
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
x1 - x x x
x2 x - x x
x3 x x - x
x4 x x x -
x5 - x x x
x6 x - x x
x7 x x - x
x8 x x x -
x9 x
Regarding cluster structure, the degree of interdependence between agents is key.
In the present model, interdependencies between activites are argued to follow a block
distribution with varying block length (see also Table 1). All elements in a block are
mutually interdependent.9 Since the division of labour in the cluster does not need to
coincide with the block length n = l, some interdependencies reside at the level of
agents (denoted by x in Table 1) while others connect the activities of different agents
(denoted by x).
With greater interdependence in the production process (higher l), the extent of
cross-agent externalities increases for any given division of labour (see also Table 1).
To capture this effect, the model assumes three different levels of interdependence
between production activities: Low (l = 4), medium (l = 8) and high interdependence
(l = 12).10 Growing inter-agent externalities lead to greater benefits for collective local
cultures: Altruistic agents internalise these externalities into their choice of strategy,
which will give better results as the role of inter-agent interdependence increases.
Moreover, these agents are less likely to select modifications encountered by their
search activity as the average expected fitness of a greater number of elements has
to be improved. This implies that altruists will tend to change their configuration
less frequently than egoists. This relative ‘inactivity’ can be beneficial as growing
interdependence between agents means that changes in configuration by one actor
impact more strongly on the fitness of other agents (Kauffman 1993). Frequent changes
in strategy could therefore disturb others, inducing them to respond by changing their
configuration as well. Taken together, this can have a destabilising impact on the
cluster’s adjustment process.
Proposition 1 In clusters with medium or high interdependence, altruists will be
better for cluster adjustability than egoists.
Regarding environmental conditions, the frequency of change events will be deci-
sive. The greater time required for altruistic agents to encounter superior modifications
9 This setup yields a fully decomposable system as defined by Simon (2002). However, following Dosi
et al. (2003), the division of labour does not follow the size of the blocks here.
10 In the low interdependence case, blocks of l = 4 activities are mutually interdependent. Each activity thus
influences its own fitness contribution as well as that of l − 1 = 3 other activities. Similarly, in the medium
and high interdependence case, each activity impacts on 7 and 11 other activites. These interdependence
structures are implemented for a cluster with N = 24 activities split into four substrings with n = 6
activities each.
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could be a disadvantage in situation where environmental change is relatively fast. As
a result, the greater speed of egoists will benefit cluster adjustment in situations where
the time left to adjust to a change event is short. Moreover, the extent of change will
matter for the relative performance of the different cluster types. As was highligh-
ted above, altruists propose strategies that are better for the cluster as a whole while
egoists are faster in finding (on average) inferior configurations. In environments where
change is only partial (disturbance environments), the good configurations found by
altruists could persist over a longer time than in shock environments where the entire
fitness landscape changes.
Proposition 2 The presence of more altruistic agents is of greater benefit to cluster
adjustment if the environment is relatively stable.
3 Results
The following simulations consider a cluster with N = 24 elements split evenly bet-
ween four groups of producers.11 Each group of producers hosts five agents that all
conduct the n = 6 activities in their respective substring. Simulations were run for
slow and fast shock environments where the fitness of all 24 elements was altered
after 600 and 300 simulation steps. Slow and fast disturbance environments corres-
pond to situations where the fitness of six randomly selected elements in the fitness
landscape is changed after 600 and 300 simulation steps. Both types of environments
were investigated for clusters with low, medium and high interdependence in their
production process. For each setting, 100 change events were simulated to account
for performances in the majority of cases. In shock environments, the results repor-
ted here correspond to the averages and standard deviations of fitness values over
the 600 simulation steps, which were averaged over all 100 simulations (each repre-
senting one change event). In disturbance environments, average fitness and standard
deviation were averaged over the length of one simulation run, featuring 100 change
events. Both values were determined at the level of the entire cluster as well as for
each producer group.
Three important criteria for the impact of defecting (egoistic) agents on their group
and the cluster are put forth. First, defection has to pay for agents, i.e. the fitness of the
group hosting egoistic agents has to be higher than in the benchmark case where all
agents are altruistic. Second, a stable collective local culture requires that defection is
sustainable. Sustainable defection here is defined as situations where the presence of
egoistic agents in the first group does not decrease the fitness of the second group too
extremely. As both groups are interdependent (akin to the setting described in Table 1),
egoistic behaviour in the first group is likely to reduce the fitness of the second one.
If the fitness obtained by the second group were below the level obtainable in the
situation where all agents in the cluster defect (Ego), we would face a prisonner’s
dilemma payoff situation and defection would become the dominant strategy in the
11 The simulation model was implemented and run with the Laboratory of Simulation Develop-
ment (LSD) platform developed by Marco Valente. For detail on LSD, see http://www.business.
aau.dk/∼mv/Lsd/lsd.html.
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cluster. In this case, the collective local culture is destroyed by an invasion of egoists
and defection will not be sustainable. For cases of sustainable defection, the paper then
investigates whether this defection is also beneficial for the cluster, i.e. if the fitness
value obtained by clusters with egoistic agents is greater than the one found for the
fully collective case.
3.1 Shock environments
In shock environments, the two benchmark scenarios of clusters with only
defecting (Ego) or co-operating (Coll) agents perform relatively similar in adjustment
(see columns 1 and 2 in Table 2). This suggests that the aforementioned advantages
and shortcomings of co-operating and defecting agents (adjustment speed versus opti-
mality and stability) are relatively similar in this situation. The performance of either
local culture for the different groups however differs (see columns two and three
in Table 3).12 For instance group 2 obtains a fitness value of 0.7390 when cluster
behaviour is under the egoistic regime in the medium interdependence case. Under
the collective regime and the same conditions, the average fitness of group 2 is lower
(0.7238). Similar aspects hold for the other agent groups in the cluster (results not
reported here). A specific local culture may thus be optimal for the cluster but not
necessarily for all agent groups (and vice versa).
Table 2 Adjustment to slow and fast shock environments: cluster fitness
Slow Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 0.7412 0.7389 0.7409 0.7410 0.7403 0.7401 0.7366
Medium 0.7321 0.7355 0.7342 0.7345 0.7319 0.7346 0.7252
High 0.7177 0.7177 0.7140 0.7192a 0.7160 0.7190 0.7152
Fast Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 0.7397 0.7384 0.7395 0.7395 0.7387 0.7386 0.7353
Medium 0.7289 0.7317 0.7308 0.7312 0.7287 0.7311 0.7223
High 0.7138 0.7137 0.7100 0.7150 0.7118 0.7144 0.7108
a Bold cases of sustainable and beneficial defection
Regarding the performance of clusters with a limited number of defecting agents,
the model finds that egoistic behaviour by an entire group (Ego5) is never sustainable
within a collective local culture. This constellation exhibits a pay-off structure similar
to the prisoner’s dilemma. If an entire group defects (here: group 1), its fitness value
becomes maximal. The co-operating neighbour group (here: group 2), however, has
a fitness value below that in the egoistic case (all defect). In such a situation, the
collective local culture would be replaced by the egoistic one as there is only one
dominant strategy for each group: Defection.
12 For simplicity and space reasons, only the fitness values of groups 1 and 2 are reported here as they are
decisive for determining whether defection pays and/ or is sustainable.
123
78 K. Press
Table 3 Adjustment in slow and fast shock environments: group fitness
Slow Gr. Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 1 0.7457 0.7388 0.7448 0.7509 0.7507 0.7485 0.7608
2 0.7505 0.7512 0.7474 0.7414 0.7423 0.7442 0.7160
Med. 1 0.7390 0.7417 0.7344 0.7343 0.7351 0.7422 0.7635
2 0.7306 0.7238 0.7327a 0.7372 0.7187 0.7219 0.6615
High 1 0.7105 0.7284 0.7094 0.7179 0.7073 0.7194 0.7748
2 0.7225 0.7099 0.7206 0.7247b 0.7257 0.7173 0.6488
Fast Gr. Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 1 0.7444 0.7373 0.7434 0.7494 0.7493 0.7468 0.7579
2 0.7486 0.7496 0.7459 0.7397 0.7404 0.7424 0.7176
Med. 1 0.7358 0.7389 0.7313 0.7317 0.7321 0.7402 0.7540
2 0.7272 0.7192 0.7288 0.7333 0.7149 0.7165 0.6670
High 1 0.7067 0.7239 0.7059 0.7145 0.7042 0.7166 0.7609
2 0.7191 0.7055 0.7162 0.7129 0.7197 0.7094 0.6522
a Italics cases of sustainable defection
b Bold cases of sustainable and beneficial defection
The only cases in which defection can be sustainable within the collective local
culture are those clusters in which the first group exhibits both co-operating and defec-
ting agents. The existence of one or two egoistic agents is sustainable for clusters with
medium interdependence, whereas a cluster characterised by high interdependence
could host two or three defectors (see numbers in italics in Table 3). Results for an
adjustment time of 300 steps after each total environmental change are identical, except
for the fact that in high interdependence clusters, the first group can only hold three
defectors. However, sustainable defection is almost never beneficial to cluster adjust-
ment. There is only one case in which defection is both sustainable and beneficial: A
cluster responding to slow shocks with high interdependence and two defecting agents
in the first group (see number in bold in Table 2).
A final aspect worthy to note is the effect of defection on the fitness of the agent
group from which defectors originate (group 1). As interdependence increases, defec-
tion pays less. In the low interdependence case, the average fitness of group 1 in case of
Ego1-5 was always above the value obtained in the collective case, i.e. defection rather
than collaboration benefited the group itself. In the medium and high interdependence
scenario, this no longer holds for mixed agent groups (see fitness values of group 1 in
Table 3). This stems from the fact that with growing interdependence, defecting agents
in the first group tend to disturb those in the second one more strongly. As actors in
the second group try to adjust to these interferences, their strategies may also have
adverse repercussions on the first group. Defection thus pays less as interdependence
in the cluster grows.
These results suggest that clusters in shock environments with low interdependence
in production are unlikely to exhibit collective local cultures. Defection pays for the
agent’s group and is not sustainable within the local culture suggesting that one would
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witness a shift from the altruistic to the egoistic case. If interdependence is medium
or high, however, collective local cultures are more stable. Although defection would
hardly be sustainable or beneficial for the cluster, the incentives are low as it does not
pay for the agent and her group to behave egoistically. Nonetheless, the benefits of
having a collective local culture over an egoistic one are relatively small.
3.2 Disturbance environments
In contrast to the case of a total environmental change, the two benchmark cases
of ‘pure-strategy’ clusters (Ego and Coll) perform very differently if change is only
partial. Here, the collective case always excels and its lead increases with interdepen-
dence between cluster agents (see Tables 4 and 5). In line with proposition one, this
suggests that the advantages of altruistic agents regarding stability and performance
of adjustment are more important than the speed of finding new agent configurations.
This aspect grows in importance (as suggested in Sect. 2.3) as the extent of interdepen-
dence between actors grows. While speed may matter for clusters facing very volatile
environments, optimality is a greater concern in more stable conditions.
Similarly to the case of shocks, a cluster’s local culture can be optimal for the cluster
as a whole while not maximising the fitness value of all agent groups. Moreover, an
entire group of egoists is not sustainable. However, mixed groups with egoistic and
altruistic agents (Ego1-4) are all sustainable degrees of defection in the case of partial
environmental change (i.e. the fitness level of the neighbour group 2 does not decrease
below the egoistic case; see numbers in italics in Table 5).
An interesting aspect regards the comparison of cluster adjustment to partial envi-
ronmental change for different adjustment times (600 versus 300 simulation steps).
While this does not alter the results regarding sustainable defection, it has a significant
impact on the number of cases in which defection is also beneficial (see numbers in
bold in Table 4). Clusters facing a slow disturbance environment find sustainable and
beneficial defection for the case of two egoists in a medium interdependence cluster.
Clusters exposed to a fast disturbance environment find six cases of sustainable and
beneficial defection. This increase in sustainable and beneficial defection shows that
Table 4 Adjustment in slow and fast disturbance environments: cluster fitness
Slow Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 0.7309 0.7431 0.7421 0.7412 0.7413 0.7414 0.7383
Medium 0.7234 0.7348 0.7284 0.7368a 0.7322 0.7334 0.7269
High 0.6999 0.7262 0.7258 0.7231 0.7218 0.7226 0.7222
Fast Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 0.7229 0.7329 0.7331 0.7334 0.7344 0.7331 0.7297
Medium 0.7178 0.7325 0.7292 0.7299 0.7300 0.7333 0.7244
High 0.6915 0.7249 0.7233 0.7254 0.7246 0.7242 0.7146
a Bold cases of sustainable and beneficial defection
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Table 5 Adjustment in slow and fast disturbance environments: group fitness
Slow Gr. Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 1 0.7327 0.7436 0.7411 0.7433 0.7485 0.7474 0.7610
2 0.7227 0.7304 0.7357a 0.7325 0.7286 0.7272 0.7039
Med. 1 0.7441 0.7510 0.7354 0.7422 0.7447 0.7442 0.7827
2 0.7013 0.7294 0.7394 0.7339b 0.7096 0.7161 0.6643
High 1 0.6902 0.7140 0.7378 0.7218 0.7205 0.7248 0.7811
2 0.6996 0.7410 0.7150 0.7202 0.7202 0.7169 0.6484
Fast Gr. Ego Coll Ego1 Ego2 Ego3 Ego4 Ego5
Low 1 0.7236 0.7292 0.7397 0.7381 0.7358 0.7358 0.7509
2 0.7259 0.7406 0.7317 0.7333 0.7342 0.7338 0.7055
Med. 1 0.7301 0.7469 0.7420 0.7499 0.7357 0.7411 0.7682
2 0.7072 0.7278 0.7232 0.7288 0.7318 0.7378 0.6740
High 1 0.6925 0.7386 0.7266 0.7283 0.7304 0.7410 0.7720
2 0.6901 0.7062 0.7233 0.7290 0.7181 0.7063 0.6552
a Italics cases of sustainable defection
b Bold cases of sustainable and beneficial defection
the speed advantages of egoistic agents materialise quite strongly in clusters with envi-
ronments that change frequently but are more stable regarding the extent of change.
Contrary to the case of total environmental change, the benefit of defection to the
originating group (group 1) does not straightforwardly decrease with cluster inter-
dependence (compare the fitness values of group 1 in Table 5 for the low and the
high interdependence case). Defection therefore also pays for the originating group in
cases of low of high interdependence within the cluster. Clusters facing disturbance
environments would therefore tend to exhibit stable collective local cultures as these
convey significant performance benefits. While defection pays, it is also sustainable
and at times beneficial to adjustment - unless an entire group of producers in the cluster
starts to behave egoistically.
The fact that defection is only sustainable in mixed agent groups brings about
the question of its impact on group and cluster dynamics. As was highlighted in
Sect. 2.1, agents in the cluster engage in a bidding process to have their configuration
chosen to represent the group. This mechanism implies that the observation of and
learning from competing firms in a cluster (represented by all agents in one group)
leads to a diffusion of best practice. In clusters, this best practice corresponds to
agent strategies that work well in the context of other’s activities. As a result, the
bidding process was based on expected cluster fitness, i.e. the agent proposing the
best configuration for the cluster was chosen to represent her group. Agent behaviour
(i.e. her adherence to or defection from the collective local culture) will thus only
impact on the dynamics of her group and the cluster if she gets to be chosen in the
bidding process.
The likelihood of being chosen however differs for egoistic and altruistic agents. As
altruists choose strategies that are beneficial for the cluster, their selection mechanism
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is identical to the choice criterion of the bidding process. This decreases the likelihood
that egoists come to determine group behaviour.13 The likelihood of being chosen
further decreases for egoistic agents if there are fewer of them (i.e. fewer ‘egoistic’
configurations being proposed) and if interdependence between agent groups increases
(as defecting agents do not take this interdependence into account when proposing their
configurations). In constellations where the remaining co-operating agent(s) in the first
group dominate group behaviour, we find cluster dynamics that are very similar to the
collective case (and that might exaggerate the extent of sustainable defection) - except
for the fact that with fewer co-operating agents per group, adjustment would proceed
more slowly as the number of agents searching ‘collectively’ declines.
To account for this aspect, the bidding process was changed to favour those configu-
rations that led to the highest expected average fitness for the respective agent group.14
This implies that agent and group selection criteria now favour strategies proposed by
defectors, which would lead to a greater impact of defectors on group and cluster dyna-
mics. The likelihood that defector strategies dominate the behaviour of the first group
then increases with the number of defecting agents and decreases with the extent of
inter-agent interdependence. This modification only leads to greater amounts of sustai-
nable defection in the case of partial environmental change. However, this defection is
never beneficial to the adjustment of the cluster as a whole (results not reported here).
4 Discussion
The present paper set out to investigate whether defection from a collective local
culture can be sustainable in clusters and to what extent it may even benefit the
cluster’s adjustment to changing economic conditions as has been suggested in the
literature. It finds that egoistic agents defecting from a collective local culture provide
benefits regarding the speed of adjustment while altruistic ones complying with the
established consensus allow for better and more stable adaptation. The advantages and
shortcomings of both agent types map out differently depending on the nature of the
cluster, the environment and the role of defectors for group behaviour.
Regarding the nature of the cluster, the extent of externalities between agents mat-
ters. In clusters characterised by high interdependence between agents (i.e. clusters
with strong agglomeration externalities), compliance with a collective local culture
is very beneficial. Altruistic agents gearing the selection of their strategies at the
well-being of the entire cluster internalise the externalities of their activities into their
strategy selection. While this optimisation of agent configurations tends to take longer,
its results become superior, the greater the importance of the inter-agent externalities.
As a consequence, clusters with very interdependent production processes will tend
to have collective local cultures. Even if defecting agents are located in the cluster,
they are relatively unlikely to come to dominate group behaviour as their selection
13 An agent wanting to improve the expected average fitness of the n = 6 activities under her control is less
likely to find configurations that increase the expected average fitness of the cluster. She would therefore
have a smaller likelihood to be chosen as the group representative if there are agents in the group that already
seek strategies improving the expected average fitness of the N = 24 activities making up the cluster.
14 Such a setting could be imagined for clusters that do not only trade a final product but also intermediates.
123
82 K. Press
mechanism performs very badly in comparison to that of altruists. It therefore seems
as if agglomeration externalities (inter-agent interdependence) and a collective local
culture are reciprocally interdependent: While the literature argues that a (collective)
local culture is needed to establish agglomeration externalities, the findings presented
here suggest that once established, agglomeration externalities support a collective
local culture by reducing the payoff for defection.
As far as the nature of the environment is concerned, the extent and frequency of
change acts as a main determinant. In very volatile environments (total environmental
change), the advantages and downsides of altruistic and egoistic strategies (speed ver-
sus optimality and stability) are relatively equal. This notion is supported by the small
differences in adjustment performance between the benchmark cases of collective and
egoistic clusters. Moreover, defection in mixed strategy clusters is only sustainable in
a limited number of cases and there is only one situation in which defection is both sus-
tainable and beneficial to the cluster. This evidence would suggest that clusters facing
extremely volatile economic conditions have are limited incentives to establishing a
collective local culture as compared to adopting a ‘Darwinist’ attitude that allows
every agent to act in her own best interest. This picture changes in the case of partial
environmental change. Here, the benefits of altruistic agents regarding performance
and stability of adjustment materialise more strongly. The speed advantage of egoistic
agents only becomes important if the time to adjust to change is short. In sum, clusters
in less volatile environments benefit very strongly from establishing a collective local
culture as compared to the egoistic case. The strong benefits to altruistic agents in this
setting then imply that defection may play a more limited role in the dynamics of agent
groups and the cluster - provided that groups do not contain defecting agents alone.
Finally, the role of egoistic agents for group behaviour is key. This relates to the
criterion for best practice in the cluster. In cases where best practice of an agent
group is based on the highest expected cluster fitness, co-operating agents have a
greater likelihood to dominate group behaviour as their individual selection mechanism
corresponds to the choice criterion at the group level. This situation could be expected
in clusters where all activities contribute to the manufacture of one final product. In
cases where best practice in the group is based on highest expected average group
fitness, the selection mechanism of defecting agents is closer to the group level one,
thus giving defectors a greater likelihood of being chosen. This could be the case in
clusters where not only the final product is traded beyond the cluster’s boundaries but
also the intermediate goods produced by each agent group. In the case of a bidding
process based on agent group fitness, there tends to be less sustainable defection
in volatile environments, suggesting that such clusters should tend to exhibit more
egoistic local cultures.
These findings highlight a variety of issues that are usually left more implicit in the
literature. Nonetheless, several limitations remain. First, the model gives an admit-
tedly rough account of the microdynamics underlying co-operation and defection in
clusters. By aggregating agent dynamics into a single group configuration in every
simulation step, a number of aspects at the agent level (such as individual fitness)
are lost. Second, by measuring average fitness over 300 or 600 simulation steps and
aggregating these over 100 simulations, we obtain results for the effects of defection
in a majority of cases. In other words, the model describes the extent of defection
123
When does defection pay? 83
that is sustainable and/or beneficial to the cluster in most cases whereas there may be
simulations in which more or less defection pays. Third, in order to isolate the effect
of defection on cluster performance, the model treats the extent of agglomeration
externalities (interdependence) as given. When following the argument of the exis-
ting literature, however, the extent of agglomeration externalities could be expected
to change with defection of cluster agents: If defectors are excluded from all future
network exchanges, this will have repercussions on agent interdependence in the clus-
ter. Since the degree of interdependence is an important determinant of N/K system
dynamics, this aspect was left unaccounted for to avoid that results would be driven by
other forces than the one under study here. Finally, the model currently does not have
emergence or selection dynamics at the level of cluster agents. In real-world clusters,
it could however be imagined that the effects of defection on other agents might be so
severe, that these actors are no longer competitive and have to leave the market. This
would then have repercussions on the performance of remaining agents and the cluster.
While these limitations imply that the model results should be read as tendencies
rather than deterministic predictions, the findings do indicate that defection pays less
in clusters than could have been expected. As a result, a collective local culture can
be more stable than is usually acknowledged. Moreover, the model highlights that
defection in the cluster is only likely to come to impact on group and cluster dynamics,
if defectors discover strategies that are superior to those found by agents adhering to
the local culture. To determine in greater detail how the microdynamics of co-operation
and defection map out in clusters, substantial further theoretic and empirical research
will however be needed.
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